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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         Today we determine if the normally favored "presumption 
of arbitrability," in section 301 labor relation cases, has been 
overcome by language in a collective bargaining agreement 
circumscribing the jurisdiction of a dispute resolution body.  
Here the union filed a grievance before the Peer Review Panel 
over the extent of health insurance benefits.  
         Because we find that the union, in essence, seeks to 
have the Peer Review Panel effectuate a change in benefits, a 
matter expressly reserved from its jurisdiction in the collective 
bargaining agreement, we will affirm the judgment of the district 
court entered in favor of the company.  
 
                                I. 
         North American Directory Corporation II, ("NADCO"), 
produces telephone directories.  At the time of this litigation, 
its Hazelton, Pennsylvania, plant employed approximately 200 
production and maintenance employees who were represented by 
Local 735-S of the Graphic Communications International Union.   
         NADCO and the union entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement effective December 1, 1992 to November 30, 
1995.  During the negotiation period, the concept of "peer 
review" was introduced by NADCO as an alternative to the 
traditional arbitration system.  Under this peer review system, 
employee grievances are brought before a 5-person panel dominated 
by non-managerial members (3 employees/2 management).   Despite 
some initial skepticism, the union agreed to accept the Peer 
Review Panel as the decision maker in certain workplace 
situations. 
         The description of the Peer Review Panel process at 
NADCO is found in Article 26 of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement.  The procedure for the filing of 
grievances, abbreviated for our purposes, is as follows: 
         Article 26.1  A grievance is defined and restricted to 
         an allegation that the employer has violated a specific 
         provision of the collective bargaining agreement.  A 
         grievance as defined herein, shall be processed as 
         follows: 
 
         STEP 1:  A grievance shall be brought to the 
         attention of the grievant's supervisor within 
         five (5) working days of the act or omission 
         being grieved . . . .  The supervisor must 
         answer the grievance within three (3) working 
         days of the presentation. 
 
         STEP 2:  If agreement is not reached at the 
         Step 1 discussion, the grievant shall have 
         three (3) working days thereafter in which to 
         file a written grievance with his/her 
         department head (or designated Company 
         representative) . . . .  The department head 
         (or designated Company representative) must 
         answer the grievance in writing within five 
         (5) working days of its presentation or any 
         meeting. 
          STEP 3:  If the grievance is not settled at 
         Step 2, the grievant shall have three (3) 
         working days from receipt of the Step 2 
         answer in which to appeal the Step 2 decision 
         in writing, by submitting the grievance to 1) 
         a Peer Review Panel, or 2) the Plant Manager 
         (Senior Management), whose decision(s) will 
         be final and binding on the grievant, 
         management and the Union. . . .  The Peer 
         Review Panel or Plant Manager shall have five 
         (5) working days after meeting in which to 
         answer the grievance in writing. 
 
                              * * * 
 
         The Panel will not have the authority to 
         render a decision which will add to, subtract 
         from, or change the meaning of specific 
         provisions of the contract; nor shall the 
         Panel have any authority to change Company or 
         plant policy, pay rates, benefits, work rules 
         or to determine future contract terms. 
 
         Details of the peer review procedure were finalized by 
a joint committee of union members and NADCO management and were 
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
addendum reads in relevant part: 
         INTRODUCTION: 
 
         The company and the union recognize that from 
         time to time an associate may encounter a 
         problem, question or complaint that, if left 
         unresolved, could affect job satisfaction and 
         work performance. . . . 
 
                              * * * 
 
         [W]hen an associate is faced with a situation 
         that has not been satisfactorily resolved by 
         traditional means, the PEER REVIEW procedure 
         may be used.  Peer Review is a formal problem 
         solving system designed to ensure that each 
         associate's concerns are given careful 
         consideration and conflicts are resolved 
         quickly and fairly. 
 
         SCOPE OF AUTHORITY: 
 
         A Peer Review Panel will hear grievances that 
         have not been resolved at an earlier step of 
         the Grievance Procedure.  In other words, 
         peer panels may review management's actions 
         to ensure that the application of the 
         contract was followed correctly and fairly.  
         If they find otherwise, they have the 
         authority to rectify the situation consistent 
         with contract provisions, company practices 
         and/or policies. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
         The Peer Review Panel can not change contract 
         provisions, company policy, work rules, wage 
         scales, or benefits.  When a promotion is 
         grieved, the panel can determine whether or 
         not the job was filled in accordance with 
         Article 16.0 of the contract.  If the Peer 
         Review panel decides it was not done 
         properly, the panel can require the process 
         be re-done in accordance with the contract. 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  The addendum further delineates the 
selection process for the members of the panel and describes the 
format of its meetings.     
         The mechanics of the grievance procedure were invoked 
when a dispute arose under the provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement which obligates NADCO to provide health 
insurance coverage.  Article 17.1 succinctly states:  "NADCO will 
provide Health Insurance benefits, including dental, as described 
12/22/92, subject to employee copay of 10% of prevailing premium 
rate."  No further written elucidation of the benefits exists and 
the parties join issue over the particulars of the agreed-upon 
coverage.  
         The parties do agree, however, that the insurance 
coverage changed under the new agreement.  Facts not in dispute 
are that, effective February 1, 1993, NADCO increased its payment 
of existing premiums from 85% to 90% and that the annual major 
medical deductible payments were increased from $100 to $200 per 
individual and from $200 to $400 per family.  There is no such 
mutual understanding, however, concerning other changes to the 
package.  Particularly, the union disputes its acceptance of the 
portion of the insurance program which includes a deductible and 
an employee across-the-board 20% copay of the first $2,000 in 
covered medical bills.  Previously, with the exception of major 
medical costs, employees had been afforded first dollar coverage 
(no deductible and no copay) for these expenses. 
         Union members began complaining to their supervisors 
regarding reduced coverages and voiced their concerns that these 
changes were not bargained for in the new agreement.  Their 
objections culminated in August 1993 by a written filing of a 
Step 2 grievance.  The union expressed its complaint as follows:  
         The health plan currently in effect at NADCO 
         is not the plan we agreed to implement in 
         negotiations which took place on 12/22/92.  
         Our understanding was the plan we had was to 
         remain the same except that the deductible 
         would change from $100.00 single/$200.00 
         family to $200.00 single/$400.00 family.  
         Also the copay of 15% would decrease 5% to 
         10% copay.  We also agreed the carrier would 
         remain the same.  (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
         Northeast Pa. Wilkes-Barre)  The Major 
         Medical portion of the plan would be 80/20 of 
         the next $2,000.00 dollars after the 
         deductible is met.  Instead we now pay 80/20 
         of all charges up to $2,000.00. . . .  The 
         coverage by Blue Shield has also changed.  
         (ex. Surgical Services) 
         The union then requested the following relief: 
         Remedy:  We want the same Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan 
         provided by NADCO to it's [sic] employees as we 
         understood it to be on 12/22/92.  This plan is the same 
         plan the employees had prior to signing the contract 
         with the following exceptions: 
 
         1.   $200.00 single/$400.00 family 
 
         2.   Copay at 10% 
 
         This plan will be provided by Blue Cross/Blue 
         Shield of Northeast Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa.  
         Also, All employees who had to use the other 
         plan will be reimbursed for any payment they 
         may have made that should have been covered. 
 
         NADCO rejected the grievance, citing two reasons -- one 
procedural, that the grievance was untimely filed, and one 
substantive, that the benefits provided are the benefits as 
bargained for and agreed upon.  The denial further stated: 
         Finally, while we expect the above 
         explanation will amicably resolve this 
         grievance, I want to point your attention to 
         Step 4 of the Grievance Procedure, which, 
         among other things, precludes the peer review 
         mechanism from changing benefits. 
 
By this language NADCO implicitly precluded appeal to the Step 3 
level, the convocation of the Peer Review Panel.   
         Following this denial, the union filed a complaint in 
the district court under Section 301 of the Labor Relations 
Management Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to compel 
NADCO to accept the grievance for peer review adjudication.  
After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
         The district court granted NADCO's motion, holding that 
the union grievance sought to impose a change in the health 
insurance benefits, a matter strictly precluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Peer Review Panel:  "The [collective 
bargaining agreement] limitation is expansive and unambiguous -- 
a peer review panel cannot reach a decision that requires the 
Company to provide benefits different from those benefits which 
the Company believes it is obligated to pay under the CBA."  
Graphic Communications International Union, Local 735-S v. North 
American Directory Corporation II, No. 93-CV-1991, slip op. at 12 
(M.D. Pa. filed Jan. 12, 1996).  The union filed a timely 
appeal.  
          
                               II. 
         The dispositive issue is whether adjudication of the 
union's grievance falls within the jurisdictional purview of the 
Peer Review Panel. 
         We recognize initially that the question of whether the 
union's grievance is arbitrable is one for the court to decide.  
AT&T Technologies Inc. v. Communication Workers of America, 475 
U.S. 643, 649 (1986).  Second, we acknowledge the general 
presumption favoring arbitrability of labor matters.  The Supreme 
Court's decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy firmly established 
these principles and AT&T Technologies revalidated arbitration's 
special status: 
         [W]here the contract contains an arbitration 
         clause, there is a presumption of 
         arbitrability in the sense that "[a]n order 
         to arbitrate the particular grievance should 
         not be denied unless it may be said with 
         positive assurance that the arbitration 
         clause is not susceptible of an 
         interpretation that covers the asserted 
         dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor 
         of coverage."  Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 582- 
         83. . . .  "In the absence of any express 
         provision excluding a particular grievance 
         from arbitration, we think only the most 
         forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the 
         claim from arbitration can prevail."  Warrior 
         & Gulf, supra, at 584-85. 
 
475 U.S. at 650.          
         Finally, we refer to the Court's caution that since 
arbitration is a contractual matter, there must be agreement to 
submit the dispute to arbitration before the obligation arises.  
Id. at 649, citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 
U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964).   
          Of course, this deference is to be afforded only when 
the grievance at issue is properly before the arbitral body.  As 
we noted, federal labor policy is well disposed toward congenial 
labor/management relations and will liberally apply contract law 
in favor of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.  
Ludens, 28 F.3d at 359.  Yet it is essential that the dispute 
falls within the purview of the arbitration clause.  Trap Rock, 
982 F.2d at 888.  We thus turn immediately to the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
         The language in the collective bargaining agreement 
before us allows generally for access to the grievance procedure 
where there is an allegation that the employer has violated a 
provision of the agreement.  Because the union's present 
grievance asserts that NADCO has not provided health insurance 
coverage in conformity with Article 17.1, the complaint facially 
appears amendable to the Peer Review Panel process.   
         We next inquire whether the parties intended, by either 
"express exclusion or other forceful evidence," AT&T 
Technologies, 475 U.S. at 652, to bar the Peer Review Panel from 
resolving this dispute.  By the terms of the contract, the Peer 
Review Panel is empowered to evaluate management actions.  If it 
determines that management has not acted in conformity with the 
collective bargaining agreement, the Panel is commissioned to 
rectify the problem in light of the contract and company 
practices.  Exclusionary language, however, confines the 
decisionmaking role of the panel: it "can not change contract 
provisions, company policy, work rules, wage scales, or 
benefits."  (Emphasis in original.)   
         Here, the union's grievance presented to the panel 
requested a direct remedy -- implementation of the medical 
insurance plan as the union understood it.  Despite its demand, 
the union characterizes the grievance as requesting only an 
interpretation of the Article 17 description of the health care 
package. We note that the substance, not the phrasing, of the 
grievance governs its arbitrability.  Morristown Daily Record v. 
Graphics Communications Union, Local 8N, 832 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 
1987).   
         The union then asserts that the language limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Panel serves to define its role as a "rights" 
and not an "interest" arbitrator.  In interest arbitration, it is 
within the province of the decisionmaker to "set new terms and 
conditions of employment. . . ."  Lodge 802, International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, 
Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Pennsylvania Shipping Company, 
835 F.2d 1045, 1046 (3d Cir. 1987).  Rights arbitrators, on the 
other hand, "resolve disputes involving the interpretation or 
application of terms and conditions of employment."  Id. at 1047. 
         The asserted similarity to the rights arbitration 
depicted in Lodge 802 does not exist here.  In that case, there 
was a clear intent to establish a rights only arbitration system.  
While the arbitrator was authorized to adjudicate differences as 
to "meaning, application or interpretation of any terms and 
conditions of this Agreement," he was specifically denied the 
"power to alter or modify" the terms and conditions of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Id.  
         In the present dispute, the Peer Review Panel's 
authority is not couched in terms limiting its function to an 
interpretative one.  Nor are its powers unfettered.  Instead, a 
hybrid body has been established by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  The Panel is authorized to review certain management 
actions, and, when appropriate, dictate relief.  Having granted 
such license, however, the agreement then clearly restrains it.  
Paramount to this case, the Peer Review Panel cannot change 
benefits. 
         The union's claim that it is seeking an interpretation 
of the contract is belied by its request for a specific remedy 
calling for direct action.  The present grievance can only be 
understood as an attempt to effectuate a change in the medical 
benefits provided under the collective bargaining agreement, a 
matter forbidden of consideration by the Peer Review Panel.   
         We have also considered the hollow result which would 
necessarily follow.  If the Peer Review Panel decided that the 
health care package actually provided by NADCO was not that 
bargained for on 12/22/92, a change in benefits would be 
mandated.  The union does not, and could not, argue that any 
reading of its contract with NADCO permits such action be taken 
by the Panel.  Such an outcome is not contemplated by the policy 
favoring arbitration or the basic integrity of the contract here. 
         We therefore conclude that the presumption of 
arbitrability has been overcome by express exclusion.  A 
presumption, by its very definition, is an attitude dictated by 
probability.  There is no need to presume anything here where the 
intent is expressly stated.   
 
                               III. 
         We will affirm the order of the district court awarding 
judgment to NADCO.   
 
 
 
Graphic Communications International Union, Local 735-S v. North 
American Director Corporation II, No. 96-7089 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
         The majority carefully explains that the dispute 
between the parties is limited to whether the phrase in the 
health benefits portion of the collective bargaining agreement 
"as described 12/22/92" imposes increases in deductible and co- 
payment provisions.  The union asserts that the increases are not 
"as described 12/22/92," and the employer says they are.  The 
disagreement then is straightforward and focuses on the meaning 
to be given the cryptic statement, "as described 12/22/92."  
         The union contends that the dispute is an appropriate 
subject for a grievance, defined by the collective bargaining 
agreement as "an allegation that the employer has violated a 
specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement."  
According to the union, the employer's insistence that employees 
pay an increased deductible and co-payment for hospital and 
surgical expenses violates the health benefits provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement.   
         Although it disagrees with the union's version of what 
was "described 12/22/92," the employer sidesteps that issue and, 
instead, maintains that the peer review panel, as the final step 
of the grievance procedure, lacks the authority to resolve the 
issue.  The employer points out that the collective bargaining 
agreement states:  "The peer review panel can not change contract 
provisions, company policy, work rules, wage scales or benefits," 
and argues that the union seeks to "change" the benefits 
provisions.   
         In its brief, the employer makes it clear that, in its 
view, "change" refers to the benefits that have "indisputably . . 
. been in effect for six and one [half] months before the subject 
grievance was filed."  Appellee Brief at 21.  That statement is 
based on the facts that the collective bargaining agreement was 
signed on January 9, 1993, and, on February 1, 1993, the employer 
began to impose the deductible and co-payment provisions.  
Despite grumbling by employees beginning at that time, the union 
did not file a formal grievance until August 16, 1993.   
         When it attacks the peer review panel's authority to 
"change" benefits, the employer focuses on those benefits in 
existence at the time the grievance was filed -- not necessarily 
those due under the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
employer's contention is that its action in putting lesser 
benefits into effect sets the standard, which the peer review 
panel may not "change."   
         Assuming arguendo that the union's position on the 
understanding of 12/22/92 is correct and that the increases in 
deductibles and co-payments were not included, it follows that 
using management's approach would result in denying the peer 
review panel the authority to remedy the employer's violation of 
the collective bargaining agreement.  Adopting such an 
interpretation of the panel's authority makes the description of 
benefits in the collective bargaining agreement irrelevant when 
the employer unilaterally imposes a different health insurance 
program before the grievance occurs. 
         Indeed, had the collective bargaining agreement 
explicitly provided that no deductibles or co-payments would be 
applicable, under the employer's interpretation, the peer review 
panel would still lack power to alter the benefits program 
implemented on February 1, 1993, even though the employer acted 
unilaterally.  In sum, according to its view, the employer may 
circumvent peer review simply by adopting a new benefit, wage 
scale or work rule despite collective bargaining provisions to 
the contrary.   
         It seems to me that the district court misapprehended 
the parties' positions when it stated that "the remedy sought by 
the Union is to change benefits provided by the Company under the 
terms of the CBA that went into effect on December 1, 1992."  
Actually, the union seeks to reinstate, not change, the benefits 
it says were provided by the collective bargaining agreement. 
         Of course, the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement are free to adopt a wide range of methods for resolving 
disputes over contract interpretation, including a veto power.  
In this case, however, the employer did not retain the 
nullification right it now claims. 
         The peer review procedure adopted by the parties 
provides that "peer panels may review management's actions to 
ensure that the application of the contract was followed 
correctly and fairly.  If they find otherwise, they have the 
authority to rectify the situation consistent with contract 
provisions, company practices and/or policies."  That section 
clearly sets out the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement as the basis for determining if management's action's 
are correct and fair.   
         In deciding whether a ruling of a peer review panel is 
a "change," therefore, the point of reference is the collective 
bargaining agreement -- not a practice instituted by the employer 
after the agreement was adopted.  The employer's insistence that 
the peer review panel cannot act in the circumstances here is 
simply inconsistent with the provisions of the peer review 
agreement.   
         Even if there were a conflict or ambiguity between 
various provisions of the peer review agreement, the Court is 
required to adopt an interpretation favoring the means of dispute 
resolution provided in the collective bargaining agreement.  "An 
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied 
unless it can be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that 
covers the asserted dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor 
of coverage."  United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).  See also 5 
Theodore Kheel, Labor Law § 23.07[2] (1995) (presumption of 
arbitrability compels arbitration even when parties do not 
clearly evidence a contractual intention to do so.) 
         The employer's proposed construction of the peer review 
panel's authority not only guts the dispute resolution procedure 
set up by the collective bargaining agreement, but is in conflict 
with basic tenets of labor law.  When there are gaps in a 
contract, it is generally within the purview of the arbitrator to 
resolve them.  Price v. Internal Board of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 
605, 610 (3d Cir. 1972).  See also United Steelworkers of America 
v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468 (3d Cir. 1992) (where 
collective bargaining agreement does not state who decides if 
grievance is valid, it is left to the arbitrator.).   
         I would reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand with instructions to direct the parties to submit the 
dispute for resolution by a peer review panel. 
                                 
 
